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Marino: Debunking Twombly/Iqbal

DEBUNKING TWOMBLY/IQBAL: PLAUSIBILITY IS MORE THAN
PLAUSIBLE IN OHIO AND OTHER STATES
Matthew Marino*

I. INTRODUCTION
Access to justice is a cornerstone of the American judicial system. 1
Although justice is promoted through wide access to the courts, this
interest must be balanced to prevent lawsuits that are frivolous, revengeseeking, or unreasonable.2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 3 In Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly,4 the Supreme Court abruptly departed from the longstanding
“notice pleading” standard developed for Rule 8(a)(2) fifty years earlier
in Conley v. Gibson. The Conley standard was lenient and justified a
complaint’s dismissal only if “no set of facts” could be shown to
demonstrate a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.5 The Court in Twombly set
a more stringent standard to govern complaints, holding antitrust
plaintiffs alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act must plead
sufficient factual matter to support a plausible claim for relief.6 The
Supreme Court subsequently extended Twombly to all civil cases in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal in 2009.7
A major policy motive behind the Twombly/Iqbal standard
(“Twombly/Iqbal”) is to protect defendants from burdensome discovery
requests, especially from plaintiffs who rely almost exclusively on
discovery to uncover whether their claims have merit.8 “Plausibility”
therefore requires a complaint to set out “enough facts to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of a claim for
relief.9 This has become more relevant with the advent of e-discovery,
where the use of evidence from large, electronically stored databases has
*

Associate Member, University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. See Hon. Earl Johnson Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United
States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83, 84 (citing REGINALD HERBER
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919)).
2. See Erin Schiller & Jeffrey A. Wertkin, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 12 GEO
J. LEGAL ETHICS 909 (2000-2001).
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
6. Id. at 556.
7. 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009).
8. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (citing Car Carriers v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th
Cir. 1984)).
9. See id. at 556.
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become both necessary and commonplace, making discovery more costly
and time-consuming.10
State courts remain free to follow notice pleading, and indeed most
state courts still follow some form of the Conley standard.11 Some Ohio
courts have adopted Twombly/Iqbal while others have either not decided
or expressly rejected plausibility, suggesting the issue is ripe for the Ohio
Supreme Court.12
This Comment argues that the Ohio Supreme Court should adopt
Twombly/Iqbal. Although Twombly/Iqbal is more stringent than notice
pleading, implementing Twombly/Iqbal in Ohio and other states will not
impair access to the courts as many fear,13 but rather will serve benefits
by encouraging more factually precise complaints and motions at the
initial pleading stages of a lawsuit. This will lead to more viable
complaints, better case management, and clearer expectations for
practitioners, all of which will reduce the costs associated with early pretrial litigation. Adoption of the standard in Ohio also comports with
Ohio’s tradition of modeling its own rules of procedure after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) and relying on federal case
law to interpret those rules. Further, plausibility does not mark a drastic
departure from notice pleading because it has long been implicitly
embedded in early pre-trial litigation.
This Comment will proceed as follows. First, Section II will discuss
how states have modeled their own procedural rules after the Federal
Rules, examine whether states should rely on federal law at all, and
outline Ohio’s tradition of modeling its own rules of civil procedure after
the Federal Rules and using federal case law to interpret those rules.
Section II will also dissect Twombly/Iqbal in its entirety. Sections II-C,
II-D, and II-E will serve as a guide for practitioners seeking to understand
Twombly/Iqbal. Next, Section III will argue that adoption of
Twombly/Iqbal comports with Ohio’s tradition of adopting federal
procedural law. Section III will also respond to opponents’ concerns
surrounding state court adoption of the Twombly/Iqbal. Section IV will
conclude that Twombly/Iqbal is as sensible in application as it is in theory,
10. See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond The Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 321, 322
(2008).
11. See Darcy Jalandoni & David Shouvlin, Ohio and Twombly/Iqbal: Plausible? OHIO LAW.
(Ohio State Bar Ass’n), May/June 2015, at 26 (“Inasmuch as Twombly/Iqbal dealt with procedural issues,
state courts are not bound to follow their rulings under the Erie Doctrine, and most have not. By our recent
count, of the 12 state supreme courts that have substantively examined Twombly/Iqbal, only three—
Massachusetts, Nebraska and South Dakota—have adopted the plausibility standard or something akin to
it. Nevada has declined to decide. The remaining states have declined to shift from established basic notice
pleading principles to the plausibility requirement. They are Arizona, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington and West Virginia.”). Id.
12. See infra notes 135-138.
13. See infra notes 144-146.
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reasserting that Ohio and other state courts should adopt Twombly/Iqbal
to promote pretrial litigants’ best interests.
II. BACKGROUND
This Section will raise questions surrounding the efficacy of state court
adoption of federal procedural law as well as the general workability of
Twombly/Iqbal. First, Part A of this Section will outline the debate over
whether states should adopt or rely on federal procedural law at all,
beginning with a discussion of the Federal Rules, the extent to which
states have adopted the Federal Rules, and whether it is wise for states to
adopt the Federal Rules. Next, Part B will outline Ohio’s tradition of
adopting federal procedural law. Parts C and D will then discuss Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, respectively. Finally, Part E
will discuss the aftermath of Twombly/Iqbal.
A. Controversy over State Adoption of Federal Procedural Law
The Federal Rules were adopted in 1937 to provide uniform rules of
procedure for all federal courts, to simplify pleading, and to provide more
uniformity in civil litigation.14 Professor Scott Dodson, an expert on civil
procedure and Associate Dean of Research at the University of California
Hastings School of Law, explained how the Federal Rules were strongly
criticized by some members of the legal community after their initial
promulgation.15 Dodson described how one commentator “repeatedly
admonished that the national legal community was an amalgam of
different local legal practices and cultures that should not be forcibly
unified.”16
Nonetheless, within a generation, most states had substantially adopted
the Federal Rules as a model for their own reforms. 17 A study conducted
in 1986 concluded that all state procedure in some way reflected the
Federal Rules, and twenty-three states had procedural regimes so similar
to the Federal Rules that they were deemed “replica” states.18 Dodson
suggested that the “gravitational force of federal law” can explain state
adoption of federal law despite there being no requirement to do so.19 This
refers to the general presumption that federal law is good law and should

14. See Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 548 (Ohio 2016).
15. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 708 (2016).
16. Id. at 709.
17. Id. at 709-10.
18. Id. at 708 (Citing John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (1986)).
19. Id. at 706.
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be followed.20
For instance, a strong argument in favor of the adoption of federal
procedural law is the quality of the process for amending federal rules.21
The Federal Rules are reviewed by numerous committees, the Supreme
Court, and Congress.22 These review processes include public hearings
and opportunities for advocates to offer oral or written testimony on the
rules.23 Most states cannot afford these costly processes. 24 Therefore, it
may seem that the Federal Rules are of higher quality because the federal
government has more resources.25 Further, Supreme Court opinions are a
product of “deliberative and solemn processes” whereby expert advocates
brief and argue issues of strong national importance.26 Moreover, interest
groups and practitioners are welcomed to produce and file amicus briefs.27
These processes suggest that federal law may reflect a wider-reaching
consensus regarding universally-shared policy goals.28
Although federal law may seem alluring in this regard, Dodson
explained that there are convincing reasons why state courts should not
follow federal case law or adopt federal statutes. The following
illuminates Dodson’s concerns surrounding state adoption of federal
procedural rules absent thoughtful deliberation of the policy goals to be
served by those rules:
Federal dockets have different cases and different caseloads. Federal
judges have life tenure and are less sensitive to local pressures. State
judges are under greater docket congestion and resource pressures
than federal judges. Different sets of attorneys appear in the different
courts. These differences may suggest that a state rule should be
interpreted in light of particular state contexts and norms, even if
that results in an interpretation that diverges from the interpretation
given in an identically worded federal rule.29
Dodson argued that federal law is adopted at the state level simply
because it is federal law,30 not because states “exercised rigorous

20. Id.
21. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not
Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 502
(2016).
22. Id. at 502.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 503.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. Dodson, supra note 15, at 711.
30. See id. at 715 (arguing states get caught in the “Supreme Court’s gravitational pull” and decide
without sufficient deliberation to adopt Supreme Court precedent). Id.
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independent judgment in accordance with state law and policy,”31
suggesting that blind adoption of federal procedural law is unwise and
threatens federalism.
B. Ohio’s Tradition of Adopting Federal Procedural Law
In drafting the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (the “Ohio Rules”) in
1968, the Ohio Supreme Court ordered the Rules Advisory Committee to
use the Federal Rules as a model.32 This was a "distinct advantage," as
other states had modeled their own rules of civil procedure after the
Federal rules, and there was "a considerable body of decisions" applying
the Federal Rules.33 By 1986, Ohio was the first of the ten most populous
U.S. states at the time to have substantially modeled its own rules of civil
procedure after the Federal Rules, moving before major states like New
York and California.34 The underlying philosophies behind the Federal
Rules and the Ohio Rules are largely the same, and many provisions are
identical.35
1. Class actions
Ohio Rule 23 was originally modeled after Federal Rule 23, both of
which govern class certification in class action lawsuits.36 The policy goal
of both Federal Rule 23 and Ohio Rule 23 was to open the judicial system
to more people through the class action mechanism.37 In Grubbs v. Rine,
the Ohio Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County denied certification
of a proposed class under Ohio Rule 23(B)(3), basing its determination
on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee notes to Federal Rule 23 and
federal case law.38
In Grubbs, the proposed class included tenants alleging common
injuries resulting from various misrepresentations made through oral

31. Id.
32. Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 549 (Ohio 2016).
33. Id. at 550 (citing Corrigan, A Look at the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 OHIO ST. BAR
ASSN. REP. 727, 728 (1970)).
34. See Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 513 (citing John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61WASH L. REV.
1367, 1428 (1986)) (data revealed New York, Illinois, California, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, North
Carolina, Michigan, and Virginia were still non-replica jurisdictions). Id.
35. Alvin W. Lasher, The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and Their Effect on Real Property Titles,
4 AKRON L. REV. 47, 49 (2015).
36. Grubbs v. Rine, 315 N.E.2d 832, 836 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23;
OHIO. CIV. R. P. 23.
37. Grubbs, 315 N.E.2d at 836.
38. See id. at 832.
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contracts with their landlord.39 Both Federal Rule 23(b)(3) and Ohio Rule
23(B)(3) require that questions of law or fact common to the proposed
class members predominate over questions affecting only individual
members.40 Because the proposed members’ claims all depended on
different oral contracts with their landlord, the court held the class action
device was inappropriate because the common claims of the class
members did not predominate over their more particularized claims.41
In Grubbs, the court cited the Federal Rules Advisory Committee note
to Federal Rule 23(b)(3), which provided that “a fraud case may be
unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in
the representations made.”42 The court also cited a United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania opinion explaining that
when oral misrepresentations varied between class members and would
have to be individually proven for each member, the court would have to
deny class action status.43 Relying on these authorities, the court applied
the predominance requirement and prevented certification of the class.44
Resolving every member’s individual contract dispute with the landlord
through the class action device would not have promoted “economies of
time, effort, and expense,” as the drafters of Federal Rule 23 envisioned.45
The predominance requirement prevents class certification when
proposed members’ claims would better be resolved in individual
lawsuits.46
2. Discovery
The adoption of Ohio Rule 26(B)(1) was influenced by the federal
work product doctrine.47 Ohio Rule 26(B)(1) carves out an exception for
discovery requests for documents and materials prepared in reasonable
anticipation of litigation.48 The Supreme Court developed this standard in
Hickman v. Taylor, where the Court recognized and established a
privilege for an attorney’s written statements or materials used in
preparation for trial.49 This became known as the work product doctrine.
Ohio courts subsequently adopted the work product doctrine to promote
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 836.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); OHIO CIV. R. 23(B)(3).
Grubbs, 315 N.E.2d at 840.
Id. at 836 (citing 1966 Committee Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
Id. at 836 (citing Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973)).
Id. at 840.
Id. at 836 (citing 1966 Committee Note, FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
See id. at 836 (citing Tober v. Charnita, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 74 (M.D. Pa. 1973)).
See Burnham v. Cleveland Clinic, 89 N.E.3d 536, 541 (Ohio 2016).
OHIO CIV. R. 26.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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the same important policy goal—protecting an attorneys’ mental
processes in preparation for litigation from unjustified access by opposing
counsel.50
Ohio Rule 26 mirrors the Federal Rules in other significant ways. For
instance, the 2015 amendments to Federal Rule 26(b)(1) provided that
“parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of
the case.”51 Requiring discovery requests proportional to the needs of a
case encourages lawyers to tailor more specifically their discovery
demands based on the specific facts and stakes of the case.52 Similarly,
Ohio Rule 26(B)(1) was amended in 2020 to include the italicized
language requiring proportionality in discovery requests, acknowledging
the need for discovery limitations in an era of increasingly complex civil
litigation.53
Further, Ohio Rule 26(B)(6)(b) provides a mechanism for a party to
recover inadvertently produced documents from an opponent, which was
also previously adopted in the Federal Rules.54 Recognizing the need for
procedural reform incident to the advent of e-discovery, this “claw-back”
provision allows litigants to keep confidential documents that were
accidentally disclosed as a result of discovery.55 Accidental disclosure is
all the more likely in the age of e-discovery where thousands of
documents may be requested at a time from electronic databases.56
As made evident, Ohio has adopted and amended its own rules of civil
procedure to reflect the Federal Rules and federal case law, and the Ohio
Rules Advisory Committees and Ohio courts have emphasized the same
important policy goals envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules.57
C. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007)
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly held antitrust plaintiffs
alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act must plead sufficient
factual matter to support a plausible claim for relief.58 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 required large telephone carriers to
share their networks with smaller carriers.59 Many consumers believed
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Burnham, 89 N.E.3d at 541.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
See Marcus, supra note 10, at 357-58 (emphasis added).
See OHIOCIV. R. 26, staff note (2020).
Id.
Id.
See Marcus, supra note 10, at 329.
See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549 (2007).
Id.
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that the larger carriers conspired to eliminate competition between the
smaller carriers.60 William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus brought suit
against Bell Atlantic Corporation, Verizon Communications, and other
large carriers on behalf of all telephone users for violating Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.61 Plaintiffs alleged the defendants were conspiring with
one another to keep prices high and force smaller carriers out of
business.62 Plaintiffs did not have evidence of an agreement to conspire,
but they had evidence of parallel conduct between all of the defendant
carriers, such as treating smaller competitors unfairly and refraining from
doing business in one another’s respective territory.63
Defendants argued that evidence of parallel conduct alone could not
survive a motion to dismiss, as Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules requires
all plaintiffs to clearly state why they are entitled to relief.64 Plaintiffs
argued that their complaint was sufficient under Conley v. Gibson, where
the Supreme Court held that a complaint should provide notice of the
lawsuit to the defendant and should only be dismissed if “no set of facts”
could possibly be proven to support the claim; hence: notice pleading.65
The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Court of Appeals reversed
the District Court’s determination that the complaint was insufficient.66
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter devised a new standard to
govern Rule 8(a)(2), providing that a complaint must contain enough facts
to make the allegations plausible on their face and not merely
speculative.67 Justice Souter explained that a complaint cannot be
plausible if it only contains conclusory allegations, recites labels, or lists
the elements of a claim.68 Justice Souter cautioned that plausibility does
not require a complaint to contain overly-detailed factual allegations, but
there must be some facts to demonstrate a claim for relief:
Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough
fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of
illegal agreement. And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed
even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is
improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.69

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id. at 550-51.
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id.
Id. at 556 (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).
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The Court further reasoned that dismissing implausible complaints
saves time, money, and resources by dispensing quickly with groundless
claims, especially in the context of an expensive and time-consuming
antitrust lawsuit.70 Justice Souter explained that the plaintiffs’ claims did
not meet the plausibility standard because parallel conduct alone was not
enough to demonstrate that the defendants actually agreed to engage in
anticompetitive behavior.71 Therefore, it was implausible that evidence of
such an agreement would become available upon discovery.72
Further, the court explained that judges and commentators have not
interpreted the Conley v. Gibson “no set of facts” language under the
Conley standard in its literal terms.73 To the Twombly majority, Conley
did not merely require that any set of facts may be used to support a claim,
but rather, that any set of facts could be used once the claim had been
sufficiently pled, so long as those facts were consistent with the elements
of the claim.74
Justice Stevens dissented, criticizing the majority for reading a
plausibility standard into Rule 8(a)(2), stressing that the purpose of a
liberal pleading standard in the Federal Rules is to keep litigants in court
so they have a chance to test the merits of their claims after collecting
evidence through discovery.75 Justice Stevens also explained that the
costs of discovery in expensive and complex antitrust litigation could be
avoided with better case management, careful scrutiny when ruling on
motions for summary judgment, and clear jury instructions.76 Justice
Stevens concluded that parallel conduct is circumstantial evidence
sufficient to state a claim for relief when bringing a claim of conspiracy
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the majority overstepped its
boundaries in imposing a plausibility requirement under Rule 8(a)(2).77
D. Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009)
The Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal extended Twombly to all civil
cases, holding that a complaint must allege nonconclusory facts that,
taken as true, support a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.78 In
the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, Javaid Iqbal was

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 573.
Id. at 559.
See id.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 573.
See id. at 585-86.
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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arrested on fraud charges and deemed high risk under the Bush
Administration’s policy of isolating prisoners who may be terrorist
threats.79 He was subject to harsh conditions in prison.80 Iqbal filed a
lawsuit against Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert
Mueller alleging that enforcement of the anti-terrorism policy
discriminated against him by subjecting him to harsh detention conditions
based on his religion, race, and/or national origin.81 Ashcroft and Mueller
filed motions to dismiss, which the District Court denied, finding that
Iqbal had pled sufficient allegations to survive a motion to dismiss.82 The
United States Supreme Court approved certiorari after the Court of
Appeals upheld the District Court’s ruling.83
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy applied Twombly and found
that Iqbal had not pled sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible
claim for relief.84 Kennedy found that Iqbal’s complaint was conclusory,
and the facts he did allege did not support a reasonable inference of
discrimination.85 Kennedy found that Iqbal’s claim was “nothing more
than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional
discrimination claim,” assuming the petitioners had adopted the post-911
policy “because of, ‘not merely in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”86 Therefore, the majority held that Iqbal did not state
a plausible claim for relief.87
The majority also held that Twombly was not limited to antirust cases
and applied to all civil actions, explaining that the plausibility requirement
resembled a sensible middle ground for a pleading standard:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with
a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.88

The majority also emphasized that pleading sufficient facts is essential
in claims against government officials, because lawsuits are timeconsuming and divert officeholders’ attention away from serving the

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 666.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 681.
Id. (quoting Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
Id. at 685.
Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007) (emphasis added).
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public.89
Justice Souter dissented, arguing Iqbal’s complaint was not conclusory
because it properly stated a discrimination claim on its face under
Twombly.90 Justice Souter continued by asserting that nonconclusory
allegations should be accepted as true unless completely unrealistic,
which confusingly seemed to err on the side of possibility rather than
plausibility.91
E. The Aftermath of Twombly/Iqbal
The Twombly and Iqbal decisions prompted immediate controversy.92
Congress even pursued legislation in 2009 that would have returned
pleading to the Conley standard.93 The lenient Conley standard reflected
the principles that: (1) complaints serve the simple function of putting
defendants on notice of the claims against them, and (2) the merits of a
claim should not be decided at the pleading stage, but rather through the
pre-trial discovery and summary judgment devices.94 As these ideas
became hallmarks of open access to justice through federal and state court
systems, the abrupt departure from the Conley standard catalyzed a
firestorm of research discussing the implications of heightened pleading
requirements under Twombly/Iqbal.
The context in which Twombly and Iqbal were both decided may
suggest the Court was imprudent in extending plausibility to all civil cases
with such haste.95 The Court in Twombly reasoned plausibility was
necessary in the context of expensive and time-consuming antitrust
litigation.96 Similarly, the Court in Iqbal reasoned plausibility was
necessary to insulate government officials from burdensome litigation,
which distracts them from their official duties.97 These facts suggest that
extending plausibility to all civil cases, where many of these concerns do
not always exist, may have been unwise.98
89. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685.
90. Id. at 690.
91. Id.
92. See RICHARD L. MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH, EDWARD F. SHERMAN, & JAMES
E. PFANDER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 198 (West Academic Publishing 7th
ed. 2018).
93. Id.
94. Alana C. Jochum, Pleading in Ohio after Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Why
Ohio Shouldn’t Notice a Change, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495, 516 (2010) (citing Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431 (2008)).
95. See Danielle Lusardo Schantz, Access to Justice: Impact of Twombly & Iqbal on State Court
Systems, 51 AKRON L. REV. 951, 984 (2018).
96. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573 (2007).
97. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009).
98. See Schantz, supra note 95, at 984.
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As of 2018, out of the thirty state jurisdictions that have modeled in
large part their own rules after the Federal Rules, twelve state supreme
courts have considered adoption of Twombly/Iqbal.99 Five of those
jurisdictions have chosen to follow Twombly/Iqbal, while the other seven
have maintained notice pleading.100 Studies have been largely
inconclusive surrounding the effects of Twombly/Iqbal.101 One thing is
certain, however—"implementation of [Twombly and Iqbal] can hardly
be characterized as seamless or without objections,” leading to difficulties
for practitioners and litigants in early pleading.102
Albeit vague, Twombly created some expectation of what a viable
complaint requires: (1) the complaint must provide grounds of the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief, which requires “more than labels and
conclusions;” (2) simply alleging the elements of a cause of action is not
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss; (3) more speculative allegations
will be viewed with more scrutiny; and (4) the complaint must include
factual allegations presenting “plausible grounds” indicating that the
pleader is entitled to relief, or at least that discovery will reveal evidence
of a claim for relief.103
Aside from extending Twombly to all civil cases, Iqbal added little to
the understanding of plausibility.104 The majority in Iqbal was unclear as
to why Iqbal’s complaint was conclusory, noting Federal Rule 8
99. Id. at 964-65.
100. Id. at 965 (Colorado, District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, and South Dakota have all
adopted plausibility, whereas Arizona, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Washington have chosen to maintain notice pleading).
101. William Hubbard, The Empirical Effects of Twombly and Iqbal 1, 2 (Coase-Sandor Working
Paper Series in Law & Econ. No. 773, 2016).
102. See Jochum, supra note 94, at 516-20 (citing NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (6th Cir.
2007) (Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that “a naked assertion of antitrust injury is insufficient to state a claim
under the Sherman Act, and evidence of agreements between competitors alone cannot demonstrate
plausibility of anti-competitive behavior.”)); Ferron v. Zoomego, Inc., 276 F. App'x 473 (6th Cir. 2008)
(In a diversity case involving allegations of consumer protection violations, the Sixth Circuit arguably
applied the plausibility requirement despite its confusing use of the “no set of facts” language in Conley,
ultimately holding that the plaintiff had not set out enough facts to demonstrate that the disputed
transactions were “commercial transactions” for purposes of the statutory violations); Huffman v. City of
Willoughby, 2007-Ohio-7120 (Ohio Ct. App.) (Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of
a motion to dismiss, citing the Conley language, and asserting “because it is so easy for the pleader to
satisfy the standard of Ohio Civ. R. 8(A), few complaints are subject to dismissal” (quoting Id.); Gallo v.
Westfield Nat'l Ins. Co., 2009-Ohio-1094 (Ohio Ct. App.) (Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals was the
first Ohio court to apply a limited form of the plausibility standard); Williams v. Ohio Edison, 2009-Ohio5702 (Ohio Ct. App.) (Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals applied the limited form of the plausibility
standard to affirm a granted motion to dismiss in a case involving a pro se plaintiff who had drafted a
mess of a complaint alleging employment violations).
103. See Richard O. Holloran, The Fact of the Matter: A Return to Fact Pleading? Viable
Complaints After Twombly, 44 ARIZ. ATT’Y 20, 24 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 557 (2007)).
104. See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 861 (2010).
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“demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.”105 However, Professor Roger G. Bone, a leading scholar on
civil procedure and complex litigation, described how Iqbal’s complaint
was viable under plausibility because it described mental states and linked
those mental states to a discriminatory policy described in some detail
elsewhere throughout the complaint.106 The complaint described how
Ashcroft and Mueller:
knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to impose harsh
conditions on the plaintiff as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
religion, race, or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest,
and that Ashcroft was the principal architect of this policy and Mueller
oversaw its execution.107

Bone argued that although these mental states were described with
conventional terminology, it is “not clear what other language the plaintiff
could have used and still conveyed his meaning clearly.”108
To add to the confusion, Justice Souter dissented in Iqbal despite his
majority authorship in Twombly, arguing that the allegations in Iqbal’s
complaint were actually quite specific when read in the context of the
complaint as a whole.109 Justice Souter interpreted plausibility more
leniently than the majority in Iqbal, raising serious questions as to the
proper interpretation of plausibility.110 Professor Bone argued that the
conflict between the majority and dissent in their conceptions of
“plausible” does nothing to guide the “generality-specificity
continuum.”111 In other words, Iqbal drew an even murkier line between
what separates a plausible and implausible complaint that would be viable
under Twombly/Iqbal.112
III. DISCUSSION
This Section argues that Ohio and other state courts should adopt
Twombly/Iqbal. Part A of this Section will discuss why it is reasonable
for state courts to adopt federal procedural law. Part B will contemplate
the difficulty of producing an equitable and just pleading standard and
explain how plausibility is a sensible middle ground. Next, Part C will
argue that Ohio and other similarly situated states should adopt
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 859.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 861.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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Twombly/Iqbal to serve important policy goals, encourage more viable
complaints, facilitate better case management, and provide clearer
expectations for practitioners, all of which will reduce the costs associated
with early pre-trial litigation. Finally, Part D will respond to arguments
against the adoption of Twombly/Iqbal in Ohio and other states.
A. Federal Procedural Law Should Not be Discounted at the State Level
Professor Emeritus Stephen S. Subrin and Professor Thomas Main,
both leading experts in the field of civil procedure, have argued that a
major reason why states replicate federal procedural law is to “provide
uniformity, making it easier for judges, lawyers, law professors, and law
students to master civil procedure by studying and utilizing only one
procedural regime.”113 The scholars contended that providing uniformity
is not a good reason to adopt federal procedural law and that the
sensibility of adopting federal procedural law at the state level should be
viewed with more scrutiny.114
Subrin and Main observed a “pro-defendant” spirit arising in the
Federal Rules in recent amendments, which they attribute to the increased
presence of large law firms and corporate attorneys on the Rules Advisory
Committees in recent decades.115 The authors explained how the drafters
created a “big business” narrative that plaintiffs’ attorneys had been
abusing an overly-liberal civil litigation system.116 However, this view
fails to consider the pro-plaintiff spirit of the early Federal Rules and case
law that explains the need to respond with pro-defendant rules.
Subrin and Main failed to acknowledge one of the most significant
transformations in civil procedure since the promulgation of the Federal
Rules that weighs monumentally in favor of plaintiffs—ease in obtaining
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants. This was necessary in light of
the expansion of U.S. interstate commerce, which led to an increased
likelihood that a producer’s goods or services would injure someone in a
different state.117 In McGee v. International Life Insurance, the Supreme
Court held an insurance company with only one customer in the forum
state could be subject to that state’s jurisdiction based on that single
contact.118 Coincidentally enough, McGee and Conley were both decided
in 1957 and both represented major victories for plaintiffs. The prodefendant spirit of the recent amendments to the Federal Rules criticized
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 517.
Id.
Id. at 518.
Id.
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
Id. at 223.
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by Subrin and Main should be understood as a limitation of the proplaintiff jurisprudence of the mid-twentieth century, such as Conley and
McGee, rather than an attempt by big business rule drafters to quash
plaintiffs. Therefore, the Federal Rules should not be viewed as a threat
to state court systems because of its pro-defendant spirit in recent decades,
but rather a response to changing needs of U.S. courts, which have
become flooded with litigation in more recent decades119 incident to the
expansion of interstate commerce.
Pro-plaintiff jurisprudence remained on the federal circuit despite what
Subrin and Main have described as the “anti-civil litigation” mentality
characteristic of the time periods throughout the Rehnquist and Roberts
courts.120 In Kozlowski v. Sears, the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts held businesses to a higher record-keeping
standard in order to ensure plaintiffs’ access to documents upon
discovery.121 In Corley v. Rosewood Care Center, the Seventh Circuit
held that plaintiff’s counsel’s interviews with nonparty witnesses before
trial were not subject to Rule 32 deposition requirements, which would
have required opposing counsel and a court reporter to be present.122 This
allows plaintiffs’ attorneys to collect evidence from non-party witnesses
without the burden of following formal deposition requirements.
As discussed above, Subrin and Main argued that the recent
amendments to the rules were the product of a false narrative, espoused
by the pro-business rule drafters, that plaintiffs’ attorneys were abusing
civil litigation.123 The authors relied on the rule drafters’ characterization
of discovery as becoming extremely large and complex in civil litigation,
despite the lack of empirical support for this claim.124 Therefore, the
authors reasoned that adoption of provisions like the 2015 amendment to
Federal Rule 26(b)(1), requiring discovery demands proportional to the
needs of the case, were unnecessary.125
However, there is reason to believe that discovery will become
increasingly complex and burdensome in state courts as e-discovery
becomes more prevalent.126 E-discovery and discovery abuses are not
exclusive to the high value, prominent lawsuits that arise in the federal
courts.127 Most litigation takes place in state courts; and because most
119. Judiciary Makes the Case for New Judgeships, U.S. COURTS (June 30, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/06/30/judiciary-makes-case-new-judgeships.
120. Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 518.
121. 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976).
122. 388 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2004).
123. Subrin &Main, supra note 21, at 518.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Marcus, supra note 10, at 333.
127. Id.
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Americans now utilize email and rely on computers for a variety of
activities, e-discovery is just as likely in state courts as it is in the federal
courts.128 The history of federal procedural law also suggests that ediscovery is not a big-city phenomenon, as the first federal district courts
to have local rules concerning e-discovery were in Arkansas and
Wyoming.129 Even if state adoption of federal procedural rules may prove
inconsequential in the short run because discovery is already largely
under control in state courts, as Subrin and Main suggest, it may be highly
consequential in the long run by prospectively addressing the issues that
arise incident to the increasing presence of complex litigation and ediscovery in state courts.
Lastly, in his essay arguing against state court adoption of federal
procedural rules, Professor Dodson conceded that state courts are under
larger docket congestion.130 This suggests that the recent amendments
embodying the “pro-defendant” spirit may actually help larger and more
populous states monitor plaintiff behavior that leads to docket congestion.
B. The Pleading Conundrum
Developing a workable pleading standard is troublesome. For instance,
when complaints require litigants to show only possible entitlement to
relief, it would ostensibly lead to a gross influx of complaints and little
flexibility to screen for illegitimate claims.131 Even the most far-fetched
and elaborate theory of a case is possible. For instance, it is possible that
a plaintiff’s neighbors conspired with the National Security
Administration to spy on him, but this is far from plausible, and allowing
outlandish cases to proceed to trial would impair access for those with
legitimate claims deserving adjudication. The antithesis of that is a system
in which litigants would have to state a probable entitlement to relief,
which is also undesirable.132 Litigants need discovery to uncover the
aspects of their claim that would lead to its probability. Requiring
probability at the outset of the lawsuit would require most evidence to be
identified prior to discovery, which is plainly inconsistent with the
purpose of discovery: to collect evidence. Therefore, a golden mean is
desirable, a standard in between possibility and probability—namely,
plausibility.133

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Dodson, supra note 15, at 711.
131. See Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
132. Id.
133. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 40 (Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins
trans., University of Chicago Press 2011) (Aristotle stated that virtue is the golden mean between two

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss4/9

16

Marino: Debunking Twombly/Iqbal

1082

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89

C. Advocating for Twombly/Iqbal in Ohio and other states
Twombly/Iqbal opponents have argued that the goals of plausibility
cannot be realized at the state level and that Twombly/Iqbal as a whole is
misguided.134 However, these critics have failed to consider how the
standard may evolve with time to produce favorable results in both federal
and state courts.
Rule 8 of the Ohio Rules mirrors Federal Rule 8 and requires a
complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the party is entitled to relief.”135 The meaning of this statement in
Ohio is largely unsettled.136 Some Ohio courts have expressly or
implicitly followed the plausibility standard, while others have expressly
rejected it.137 This suggests the issue is ripe for the Ohio Supreme
Court.138
The Ohio Supreme Court should adopt Twombly/Iqbal. Adoption of
the standard achieves important policy goals. These goals are common to
both state and federal courts, including the encouragement of more viable
complaints, better case management, judicial efficiency, and clearer
expectations for practitioners, all of which will reduce the costs associated
with early pre-trial litigation. Further, plausibility does not mark a drastic
departure from notice pleading because, on a general scale, it has long
been implicitly embedded in early pre-trial litigation.
D. Responding to the arguments against state court adoption of
Twombly/Iqbal
Leading experts in civil procedure have identified eight major
objections to Ohio and other state court adoption of Twombly/Iqbal: (1)
plausibility is a confusing and inconsistent doctrine; 139 (2) litigants are
unlikely to forum shop for notice pleading jurisdictions;140 (3) federal and
state uniformity will not be achieved because many replica jurisdictions

vices, “the one of excess and the other of deficiency.” For instance, courage is a virtue because it is a
sensible middle-ground between cowardice, the vice of deficiency, and rashness, the vice of excess. This
is Aristotelian virtue theory). Id.
134. See Dodson, supra note 15, at 708; Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 518; Jochum, supra note
94, at 510. Schantz, supra note 95, at 984; Hon. John P. Sullivan, Do the New Pleading Standards Set Out
in Twombly and Iqbal Meet the Needs of the Replica, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 54, 78 (2014).
135. Jalandoni & Shouvlin, supra note 11, at 26.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 26-27.
139. Jochum, supra note 94, at 525-26; see Schantz, supra note 95, at 984; Sullivan, supra note
134, at 79-81.
140. Jochum, supra note 94, at 524-25.
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have departed from the Federal Rules in various ways;141 (4) stare decisis
requires adherence to notice pleading;142 (5) discovery abuses are not a
concern at the state level;143 (6) there are constitutional concerns
surrounding the right to a jury trial when the merits of a case are decided
before the parties get a chance to engage in discovery;144 (7) it is likely
that cases with merit will be dismissed under Twombly/Iqbal;145 and (8)
the standard will result in increased costs of drafting complaints and
litigating motions to dismiss.146 This Part will respond to each of these
arguments in favor of Ohio and other state court adoption of
Twombly/Iqbal.
1. Plausibility is confusing, but future clarity is probable
The first argument against Ohio and other state court adoption of
Twombly/Iqbal is that plausibility is a confusing and inconsistent
doctrine. However, both Twombly and Iqbal were decided just over a
decade ago. Expecting absolute clarity under a recently adopted Supreme
Court standard after disrupting fifty years of precedent is plainly
unreasonable. This does not mean that the standard should be avoided,
but rather developed and solidified to serve important policy goals and
provide practitioners a clear picture of what a complaint requires.
2. Plausibility serves more important policy goals than deterring forum
shopping for notice pleading jurisdictions
The second argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that
litigants are unlikely to forum shop for notice pleading jurisdictions. This
view does not support the argument that state courts should not adopt
plausibility. The plausibility standard serves more important policy goals
than deterring forum shopping, such as encouraging attorneys to draft
more viable complaints, promoting better case management, and creating
clear expectations for practitioners.
Viable, well-worded complaints make it easier for defendants and
judges to anticipate the nature of the case and prepare responses.147 More
141. Id. at 521-22.
142. Schantz, supra note 95, at 983.
143. Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 517-21; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 88-89.
144. Schantz, supra note 95, at 983; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 81-82.
145. Schantz, supra note 95, at 983; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 82-84.
146. Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 526; see Sullivan, supra note 134, at 85-86.
147. David C. Wilkes, Drafting New York Civil Litigation Documents, 82 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 64
(2010) (although tailored specifically to drafting complaints in New York, the author explained how these
rules apply to drafting complaints in all civil litigation, and that “clear, concise, and logical documents set
the tone to [effectively] interact with opposing counsel.” (alteration added)).
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effective communication through pleading will also lead to a
simplification of the discovery process because plaintiffs will have
already specified the anticipated location of the requested materials, as
plausibility requires “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence” of a claim for relief.148 This will provide
defendants more time to prepare for discovery requests. This will not
burden plaintiffs’ attorneys by requiring them to precisely identify the
location of evidence, but only the suspected location of evidence.149
Therefore, the only added requirement that plausibility establishes for
plaintiffs’ attorneys is more effective communication in early pleading.
More effective communication in early pleading will also help litigants
refine and tailor their discovery requests to the demands of their case,150
which will help litigants comply with Ohio Rule 26(B)(1), requiring
discovery requests that are proportional to the needs of the case. This will
also eliminate the need for courts to oversee mandated pre-trial case
management meetings.151 This is very important because state courts have
fewer resources than federal courts to expend on the oversight of pre-trial
matters.152 Adoption of the standard will also create clearer expectations
for practitioners in states where plausibility has been adopted in some
jurisdictions and not others.
3. Plausibility promotes more than uniformity
The third argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that federal
and state uniformity will not be achieved because many replica
jurisdictions have departed from the Federal Rules in various ways. This
view does not support the finding that states should not adopt plausibility.
Twombly/Iqbal will serve other policy goals that are equally if not more
important than providing for uniformity. These goals are explained
above.153
4. Stare decisis does not require adherence to notice pleading
The fourth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that stare
decisis requires adherence to notice pleading. This is not a strong
148. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
149. See id.
150. See Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery Sharing, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2215 (2014) (describing the Twombly/Iqbal departure from notice pleading
reduces plaintiffs’ reliance on discovery to uncover evidence to prove their claim, leading to more
controlled discovery demands proportional to the needs of the case).
151. See Holloran, supra note 103, at 20.
152. See Subrin & Main, supra note 21, at 502.
153. See supra Part III(D)(ii).
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argument. Justice Souter in Twombly explained that a literal reading of
the Conley “no set of facts” language would result in a system where a
“wholly conclusory statement of a claim would survive a motion to
dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff
might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts’ to support
recovery.”154 The Court explained how, in practice, this was not the case,
outlining cases where the Conley’s “no set of facts language” had been
“questioned, criticized, and explained away.”155
The Court explained, as the Seventh Circuit had previously held, that
Conley had never been interpreted literally and “[i]n practice, a complaint
must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the
material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal
theory.”156 The Court also pointed to the Ninth Circuit’s previous holding
that there is serious conflict between Conley’s “no set of facts” language
and the requirement that a plaintiff must provide “grounds” for his or her
entitlement to relief.157 Further, the Court explained the First Circuit had
previously stated that Conley does not require a court to speculate as to
facts not set out in a complaint in order to turn a frivolous claim into a
substantial one.158 The Court concluded that “Conley, then, described the
breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims, not
the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s
survival.”159
Richard Halloran, an experienced litigator at the firm Lewis and Roca
LLP, reinforced Justice Souter’s assertions, explaining that requiring
plausibility in a complaint will not drastically alter early pleading:
Requiring plaintiffs to come forth at the outset with more than mere
conclusory allegations is nothing new. And ferreting out patently deficient
pleadings makes sense for both litigants and the judicial system. Requiring
plaintiffs to come forth in their complaints with enough factual allegations
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
entitling them to relief is a minor cost compared with the expenses and
burdens of litigation noted in Twombly and the strain that rising caseloads
and tight fiscal constraints have imposed on our courts.160

Therefore, experience suggests that most attorneys would not have ever
relied on the actual “no set of facts” standard, and plausibility has already

154. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
155. Id. at 562.
156. Id. (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted; emphasis and omission in original)).
157. Id. (citing Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1989)).
158. Id. (quoting O'Brien v. DiGrazia, 544 F.2d 543 (1st Cir. 1976)).
159. Id. at 563.
160. Holloran, supra note 103, at 24.
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been implicitly embedded in early pre-trial litigation despite the leniency
suggested by the literal reading of Conley.
Lastly, Ohio has a long history of adopting federal procedural law.161
Both the drafters of the Ohio Rules and Ohio courts have expressed
agreement with the policy goals envisioned by the drafters of the Federal
Rules.162 These observations suggest that stare decisis does not preclude
Ohio from adopting Twombly/Iqbal.
5. Plausibility is necessary: Excessive discovery demands are not
exclusive to federal courts
The fifth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that discovery
abuses are not a concern at the state level. However, as mentioned, the
rise of e-discovery will complicate discovery demands in both state and
federal courts,163 suggesting that Ohio and other states should adopt
plausibility to ensure that plaintiffs are making an adequate showing of a
viable claim before burdening defendants with extraordinary discovery
requests in complex litigation. Further, Ohio is also a large state with a
large population, where complex litigation and e-discovery are bound to
arise, resulting in burdensome discovery demands.
6. Constitutional issues regarding access to jury trials are no more
severe under plausibility
The sixth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that there are
constitutional concerns surrounding the right to a jury trial when the
merits of a case are decided before the parties get a chance to engage in
discovery. This concern is quickly refuted by the majority opinion in
Twombly outlining the bevy of cases rejecting a literal interpretation of
the Conley “no set of facts” standard, suggesting that plausibility has long
been embedded in early pretrial litigation.164 A transition to plausibility
does no more than solidify a long-adopted pleading practice.165
7. Cases with merit will survive motions to dismiss under plausibility
The seventh argument against Ohio and other state court adoption of
Twombly/Iqbal is that cases with merit will be dismissed more often under
plausibility. However, plausibility may actually decrease granted motions
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
Id.
Marcus, supra notes 126-124 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 73-68 and accompanying text; notes 156-154 and accompanying text.
See id.
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to dismiss in the long run because attorneys will draft more viable, wellworded complaints. Professor William Hubbard, an expert in civil
procedure from the University of Chicago Law School, described recent
studies that found increases in granted motions to dismiss under the
plausibility standard were given with leave to amend; but there had been
no change in dismissals with prejudice, which suggested plausibility had
“little effect on the share of cases effectively terminated by a ruling on a
motion to dismiss.”166 Professor Hubbard conducted his own statistical
analysis of recent federal court filings. The following outlines Hubbard’s
conclusions:
What I find is a fairly detailed and coherent picture of the effects of
Twombly and Iqbal. Twombly and Iqbal have led to a greater frequency in
filings of motions to dismiss and the amendment of complaints. But there
is little evidence that Twombly or Iqbal precipitated a major change in
dismissals with prejudice, settlement patterns, or filing rates.167

Professor Hubbard’s finding that plausibility has not significantly
increased the number of granted motions to dismiss with prejudice
suggests that access to the courts will not be compromised under
plausibility. Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to file amended
complaints. As practitioners adjust to plausibility, more viable, wellworded complaints will result at the outset of a lawsuit, leading to a
reduction in granted motions to dismiss, as well as the need to re-file
amended complaints.
8. Widescale adoption of plausibility will reduce pre-trial costs
The eighth argument against adoption of Twombly/Iqbal is that
plausibility will result in increased costs of drafting complaints and
litigating motions to dismiss. Professor Hubbard’s finding that
plausibility has led in some jurisdictions to an increase in granted motions
to dismiss with leave to amend may suggest that plausibility will create
higher pre-trial costs for litigants in jurisdictions that adopt
Twombly/Iqbal, as more complaints will require re-drafting and refiling.168 However, this view fails to consider that widescale adoption of
plausibility will create clearer expectations for practitioners. As discussed
above, this may decrease the success of motions to dismiss in the long run
because attorneys will be encouraged to draft more viable, well-worded
complaints, leading to better communication in early pleading and better
case management, leading to a reduction in the costs associated with
166. Hubbard, supra note 101, at 7.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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litigating pre-trial motions.169
IV. CONCLUSION
Twombly/Iqbal is as sensible in application as it is in theory. Aristotle
once stated that virtue is the golden mean between two vices, “the one
relating to excess, the other to deficiency.”170 Notice pleading represents
the vice of deficiency: a possibility standard, which makes it too easy to
get into court. Probability represents the vice of excess, where it is too
hard to get into court. Plausibility is sensible because it is the middle
ground. Twombly/Iqbal does not represent an impediment to justice or the
advent of a “pro-defendant” era of jurisprudence, but rather a response to
the early pro-plaintiff spirit of jurisprudence after the initial promulgation
of the Federal Rules. Twombly/Iqbal marks a shift in judicial philosophy
regarding the purpose of a complaint. Under Twombly/Iqbal, in addition
to the Conley notice requirement, plaintiffs must communicate detailed
information in their complaints to prepare the lawyers and judges
involved for the facts and allegations of the case.
More effective communication in early pleading is a benefit regardless
of whether litigants are in state or federal court because it speeds up the
pretrial process. Scholars have exaggerated the unique characteristics of
states rendering them unfit for adoption of Twombly/Iqbal. These views
have failed to consider plausibility’s potential to facilitate better case
management and more effective communication in early pleading, which
will speed up litigation and reduce docket congestion. More effective
communication in early pleading will lead to more viable complaints,
which will reduce granted motions to dismiss as well as the costs
associated with litigating them. Therefore, adoption of Twombly/Iqbal
will not impede access to the courts. Rather, it will promote important
policy goals shared by both state and federal court systems. Ohio should
adopt Twombly/Iqbal to advance these goals.

169. See supra Part III(D)(vi)-(vii).
170. Aristotle, supra note 133.
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